Many folks would like to see us back on the Moon and developing its resources.

Showing posts with label Augustine Report. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Augustine Report. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

Letter to the Augustine Commission

I have received some comments about the last post on "The $3-billion-a-year question - Can you answer the question - Why?"
It seems you think we should go to the Moon and to develop it.
Some would say we should continue with what we had set out to do.

Dr. Ronald Wells, who has a small private company and does photogrammetric analysis of lunar & planetary photos, sent me a note that he had co-written a 3-page letter to the Augustine Commission with William Mellberg, a noted aerospace historian (AW&ST; Aviation publications; last month's Keynote Speaker at the 60th Anniversary of the maiden flight of the Avro Jetliner in Toronto; author of "Moon Missions"; etc.). The letter apparently had some impact at NASA because Ron also noted that they had received a very nice reply from Michael Hawes, Associate Administrator of the Program Analysis & Evaluation Division (NASA's in-house OMB). They also had an earlier email from Jack Schmitt in support. Ron showed me these letters, too. They also sent the letter to Rep. Gabrielle Giffords (D-Az), but after they had sent copies to their cc: list.

You can read a bit more about Ronald A. Wells here. Much thanks for all the Apollo information he has sent me over the years. - LRK -
http://history.nasa.gov/alsj/Rwells.htm

Ron gave me permission to post their Augustine Commission
letter.
- LRK -

------------------------------------------------
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
Augustine Commission
Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee
NASA Headquarters
300 E St. SW
Washington DC 20024-3210

hq-humanspaceflight@mail.nasa.gov

Dear Panel Members:

Allow us to begin with a quotation:

"We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win ..."--President John F. Kennedy (speaking at Rice University in 1962)

We wish we had sent this letter to you sooner. If we had, we would have told you that the best plan for Human Space Flight that we've read was already issued last year by NASA HQ (NP-2008-08-542-HQ ), "NASA Advisory Council Workshop On Science Associated With The Lunar Exploration Architecture" (February 27-March 2, 2007; Tempe, Arizona). This workshop report was prepared by an Organizing Committee of 31 scientists distilled from material presented by 75 attending scientists.

The report justifies all aspects of America's return to the Moon in terms of conducting Lunar Science, Earth Science, Heliophysics and Astrophysics from a lunar research station located on the rim of Shackleton Crater at the Moon's South Pole. It also discusses the long-term value of such a lunar base for Planetary Science and the future exploration of Mars and other destinations (such as asteroids). It is a well-reasoned and viable plan (Apollo 17 scientist-astronaut Dr. Harrison H. Schmitt provided significant input) which NASA should be following now and in the coming decade.

We will not belabor the points already raised by a document in the public domain. But it should (at the very least) have formed the working basis for your Commission. That said, please permit us to add some further points. The implementation of the recommendations in the aforementioned NASA report would have a profound effect on the development of a new industry and economy based on space travel and the exploration of the Solar System--comparable, we would suggest, to the effect on the global economy of commercial airline development during the last century. This transition to the future should be led by the United States as we are in the best position to carry freedom and free enterprise into the New Frontier.

It is not a question of whether any one program will fit within the NASA budget. The point is that the NASA budget MUST be increased to facilitate adoption of the NASA Advisory Council's 2008 workshop recommendations (as it was during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in support of the Apollo Program). In other words, NASA should stay on course with the Constellation Program--including the development of both the Ares I (now ready for its first test launch) and Ares V launch vehicles. It is an investment in our children's future--not a waste of resources (which would be the case were these recommendations not implemented, and the work already accomplished to be cast aside).

To illustrate this point, we would like to cite four historical cases related to the lack of political will on the part of three different governments with regard to the development of the aircraft industry:

(1) The forced cancellation of the Northrop YB-49 flying wing in 1949, after contracts had already been drawn up with the U.S. Air Force, has been described by some aerospace experts as the single greatest mistreatment of an American aircraft manufacturer by the American government--and as the worst political and defense blunder in the history of the United States. Thirty years after the B-49 was cancelled (largely on political grounds), the "wheel" had to be reinvented with the Northrop B-2. What was the cost to the American taxpayer (and to aeronautical science) of the misguided decision to cancel the flying wing program (and its related stealth technology) 60 years ago?

(2) The forced cancellation by the Canadian government of the Avro C102 Jetliner, first flown 60 years ago this month, has been rated by some airline industry experts as the single greatest technological and economic blunder in Canada's history. This pioneering jet transport set numerous records as it toured major airports across North America. Howard Hughes, who owned TWA at the time, wanted to purchase the Jetliner for commercial air routes. The aircraft was a full decade ahead of any similar transport. But the Canadian government prevented the Jetliner from going into production because of political considerations. Consequently, Canada lost billions of dollars in export revenues and the opportunity to lead the world in jet transport development.

(3) In a similar defense blunder by the Canadian government, the Avro CF-105 Arrow, the most advanced jet fighter of its time, was canceled by a newly-elected prime minister on the grounds of cost savings. In a single day, that misguided decision put nearly 15,000 highly-skilled people out of work at Avro, and another 15,000 employees in support industries across Canada. The brand-new Arrows were ordered to be scrapped in the presence of armed security guards. What a total waste! Avro went out of business as a result, and Canada lost the opportunity to lead the world in the design and development of advanced military aircraft. (Canada's loss was America's gain as two dozen of Avro's best engineers came to NASA and took leading roles in the Apollo Program. Owen Maynard, for example, was a key figure in the design of the Lunar Module.)

(4) A somewhat similar fate befell the Swedish aircraft manufacturer, SAAB. Although it produced several highly-advanced jet fighters in the 1950s (Tunnan, Lansen, Draken) because successive Swedish governments had the will to pay the high price for high technology, Sweden's short-sighted leaders pulled the plug on SAAB's first commercial airliner in 1951. The Scandia, as it was called, could have enjoyed global sales. But owing to the Cold War heating up at that time, the Swedish government ordered SAAB to abandon a promising commercial program to focus on the production of warplanes. Thus, SAAB lost the opportunity to generate billions of export dollars for Sweden's economy. (The firm finally entered the airline market 30 years later with its SAAB 340 regional transport.)

The message is clear: governments which do not have the will to invest in high technology and to balance that technology between civilian enterprises (such as America's space program) and military programs do not lead the world in economic development.

The moral of these stories with respect to the current administration is that its rush to change horses in midstream--in fact, to give up trying to cross that stream at all--will lead to disastrous consequences that can have a serious effect on profligate spending which should have been more wisely invested instead of wasted.

More to the point, if we (the United States) do not return to the Moon to explore and employ its resources for the benefit of humankind, someone else will (for their own benefit). We believe, as John Kennedy believed, that America should lead the way into the New Frontier. What a tragedy it would be to turn our backs on the future--and to ignore the legacy of President Kennedy.

Every great adventure throughout history has been marked by something simple, yet profound--the will to do it.

Does America still have the will?

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Ronald A. Wells, CEO
Tranquillity Enterprises
Abingdon, VA 24211


William F. Mellberg, Consultant,
Aerospace Historian and Author
Park Ridge, IL 60068


cc: Senator Barbara Mikulski, MD
Senator Bill Nelson, FL
Charles F. Bolden, Jr., NASA Administrator

------------------------------------------------




Fig. 1. The Avro Jetliner in flight in 1949, North America’s first commercial jetliner, cancelled in production by C. D. Howe of the Canadian Government leading to the loss of Canada’s preeminence in the commercial jet industry. (By permission of George Laidlaw via Jim Floyd)



------------------------------------------------







Fig. 2. The Northrop YB-49 in flight over Edwards Air Force Base, California in 1948, cancelled by Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, after contracts had been signed with Northrop. Thirty years later, the Northrop B-2, its successor, became the preeminent U.S. bomber. (U.S. Air Force photo no. 090706-F-1234K-053)





------------------------------------------------

Two other notes from you folks I have copied below.
- LRK -

Thanks for looking up with me.

Larry Kellogg

Web Site:
http://lkellogg.vttoth.com/LarryRussellKellogg/
BlogSpot: http://kelloggserialreports.blogspot.com/
RSS link: http://kelloggserialreports.blogspot.com/atom.xml
Newsletter: https://news.altair.com/mailman/listinfo/lunar-update
Twitter: http://twitter.com/lrkellogg
==============================================================
Here's my answer:

The answer, while almost impossible to put into words, is one humanity
has addressed and answered before. Why leave Africa? Why learn to travel
over the world's oceans and colonize the other continents before anyone
was there? Why, for that matter, colonize uninhabitable places like
Arizona? Whatever the answers to these questions, any answers are
identical to the answer of, Why send people to explore and colonize the
planets?

The question should hardly be worth asking. If it is, why don't we all
just go back to a rift valley in Africa and go quietly extinct.

-- Donald
snip
==============================================================
Larry,

Virtually every science fiction writer has said that if we don't
look to the stars and plan for exploration, we will stagnate and
die. Piers Anthony in his Introduction to this little gem, "But What
of Earth?", talks about an experiment with mice (I've also heard it
with rats). These two rodents, one male and one female, are placed
in a very large cage with plenty of food, shelter and no predators.
Of course they breed like crazy. After a while the cage is
overcrowded. Even though there is still plenty of food, the rodents
start to go crazy. Some get paranoid, some attack anything, and the
young become just wierd. Well, you get the picture. Look at any
newspaper and you'll see that we have too many rats on this little
blue marble. If we don't keep looking up and dreaming; well, you get
the picture.

Tice
snip
==============================================================

WHAT THE MIND CAN CONCEIVE, AND BELIEVE, IT WILL ACHIEVE - LRK

==============================================================

Sunday, August 16, 2009

NASA's future gets bleaker: Obama faced with manned-space dilemma

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/space/orl-augustine-committee-aftermath-081409,0,7324210.story
By Mark K. Matthews and Robert Block Sentinel Staff Writers
5:54 p.m. EDT, August 14, 2009
Orlando Sentinel
President must decide to either find more money for manned space or support an emasculated program that critics will dismiss as irrelevant

WASHINGTON - When President Barack Obama named a panel to review NASA's manned-space program, his aides said privately they were hoping the group would recommend scrapping NASA's troubled Ares I rocket program and finding another, cheaper way to get humans back to the moon.

But the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee came to a troubling conclusion this week: NASA's current budget offers no hope of sending humans past the international space station for 20 years or more.

And that confronts the administration with an enormous dilemma: how, in an era of trillion-dollar deficits, to find money to reinvigorate human space exploration and avoid pulling the plug on a program that just celebrated the 40th anniversary of its first lunar landing.

snip
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am afraid that by the time it is decided that we should catch up with others going to the Moon, it will be too late for me to see it happen.

Hope you have the genes for a long life.
- LRK -

Thanks for looking up with me.

Larry Kellogg

Web Site: http://lkellogg.vttoth.com/LarryRussellKellogg/
BlogSpot: http://kelloggserialreports.blogspot.com/
RSS link: http://kelloggserialreports.blogspot.com/atom.xml
Newsletter: https://news.altair.com/mailman/listinfo/lunar-update
Twitter: http://twitter.com/lrkellogg
==============================================================
http://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=da2553d771&view=lg&msg=12325e44792c26b4
[link may not work as it comes up with my gmail account - LRK -]
FLORIDA SPACErePORT
August 17, 2009

Get Daily SPACErePORT Updates HERE.
http://spacereport.blogspot.com/

Space Panel Finds No Good Options (Source: Aviation Week)
With 18 days left in which to finish its work, the Augustine Panel is focusing on several options ranging from maintaining NASA's current plans to deferring lunar exploration in favor of direct visits to Mars and other deep space locations. NASA's current program of record -- retiring the shuttle and closing down the Space Station by 2016, developing the Ares I/Orion system as a shuttle replacement, and mounting a lunar return by 2020 -- simply doesn't fit within the FY '10 guidance, Sally Ride said. "There was not enough money to even start the lunar systems," she said.

However, the "less constrained" option, which ramps up to $3 billion a year more than the FY-10 plan, allows a lunar return by 2025. This budget, Ride said, is fairly close to what NASA's original exploration planners assumed they would have for the Constellation program several years ago. Also considered was an "ISS-focused" option that would extend station operations to 2020 but essentially sacrifice near-term exploration development in order to stay within the FY-10 plan. While a heavy-lift launcher system would be available in 2028 under this option, it would have nothing to lift, as no money would have been spent on lunar surface systems. More promising were the so-called "Deep Space" options, which would defer lunar exploration in the
near-term in favor of trips to other locations in the solar system.

Editor's Note: I have attempted to describe the various scenarios in a chart posted here. (8/13)
http://twitpic.com/e0jo2
http://twitpic.com/e0jo2/full

Augustine Panel Narrows NASA Options (Source: Florida Today)
NASA's Project Constellation cannot be executed within the $81.5 billion budgeted for human spaceflight through 2020 -- a $26.5 billion drop from previous projections -- so the Augustine Panel will bring it forward only as a reference mission. Missions to Mars -- while an ultimate goal -- will not be among scenarios offered up. The idea of doing a "Dash Out Of LEO (Low Earth Orbit) is also being dropped. It appears the Ares I rocket will be on the chopping block, while the
panel supports increasing investment in the development of commercial crew transportation services.

snip
==============================================================
http://spacereport.blogspot.com/2008/08/august-17-news-items.html
August 17 News Items
Iran Launches Home-Built Satellite Rocket (Source: AFP)
Iran said it had launched a rocket carrying a test-satellite into space on Sunday, in a move that could further exacerbate tensions with the West over its nuclear drive. "The Safir (Ambassador) rocket was successfully launched. All its systems...are Iranian made," Reza Taghipour, head of Iran's space agency, said, adding that a "test satellite was put into orbit." Western governments, which suspect Iran is trying to build an atomic weapon, have voiced concern that the Islamic republic's space program could be put to military use. (8/17)

Obama: Let's Go to Moon, and Maybe Mars (Source: Orlando Sentinel)
Sen. Barack Obama released a comprehensive space policy Saturday that endorsed sending astronauts back to the moon by 2020 as a possible precursor for going to Mars -- the first time he has committed to that goal -- and said the reach for the stars should be a U.S.-led international effort. "Human exploration beyond low-earth orbit should be a long-term goal and investment for all space-faring countries, with America in the lead," the policy paper said. It was notably silent on what role might be played by Kennedy Space Center, which faces the loss of as many as 6,500 jobs when the shuttle stops flying. Obama did promise to "work with the space industry to ensure retention of workforce and technical capabilities" during the gap. Obama's campaign released the seven-page paper to four Florida newspapers Saturday, 24 hours ahead of its national unveiling. It showed a clear effort to seize the initiative on space policy in Florida from his Republican rival, Sen. John McCain, who is scheduled to meet privately with aerospace industry officials in Cocoa on Monday. (8/17)

snip

Obama Campaign Releases Space Policy Plan (Source: Obama Campaign)
Following a series of meetings with space industry leaders, the Obama campaign has finalized a space policy document titled: Advancing the Frontiers of Space Exploration. The document contains sections dealing with Space Science and Exploration; Earth-Oriented Research; Promoting International Cooperation and Keeping Space Secure; Developing New Technologies; and Educating the Public. The document is posted at
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/policy/Space_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf.
(8/16)

snip
==============================================================
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/1185467.html
NASA's moon plan too ambitious, Obama panel says
A panel reviewing NASA's current plans for human space flight will report that there is no realistic way to return to the moon by 2020 -- or even 2028.

BY JOEL ACHENBACH
Washington Post Service

WASHINGTON -- NASA doesn't have nearly enough money to meet its goal of putting astronauts back on the moon by 2020 -- and it might be the wrong place to go, anyway. That's one of the harsh messages emerging from a sweeping review of NASA's human space flight program.

The Human Space Flight Plans Committee, appointed by President Barack Obama and headed by retired aerospace executive Norman Augustine, has been trying to stitch together some kind of plausible strategy for America's manned space program. The panel has struggled to find options that stay under the current budget and include missions worthy of the cost and effort.

snip
==============================================================
http://www.spudislunarresources.com/Opinion_Editorial/A_Moon_Full.htm
A Moon Full of Opportunity

NASA gave six reasons for going back to the Moon when only one was needed
Paul D. Spudis

The 2nd Space Exploration Conference held December 2006 in Houston outlined several reasons for a human return to the Moon. Remarkably, some complain that the reason for going to the Moon is still unclear. Possibly the sheer scope of the envisioned surface activities diffuses its impact. Almost 200 activities were described for the Moon, grouped under six major “themes” (as the agency calls them), including settlement, global cooperation, science and preparation for Mars.

This diffusion is both deliberate and unavoidable.

From the beginning, there was dissention within NASA and the broader space community about the meaning of the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE). Was it a call for a permanent moon base? Was it all about sending humans to Mars? Perhaps it was really a stalking horse to terminate human spaceflight completely. The alt-space community whined about it being another big government boondoggle. The Mars Society whined about the focus on the Moon. The scientific community just whined. Much of this confusion stems from preconceived interpretations about the new policy and has been exacerbated by resulting changes to the status quo. This confusion, nurtured by design or misinformation, must be corrected and the Vision’s direction clearly understood.

snip
==============================================================

WHAT THE MIND CAN CONCEIVE, AND BELIEVE, IT WILL ACHIEVE - LRK

==============================================================

Monday, May 11, 2009

A Lunar Base - "Augustine Report" - Should you worry?

Just received this week's issue of The Space Review, by Jeff Foust.
http://www.thespacereview.com/index.html

I think you should read.
Doesn't give me a warm fuzzy feeling.
More like, "Here we go again, don't talk about putting humans on the Moon."
- LRK -
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Bob Park gets his wish: "It's time for another Augustine Report"
---
Last week the White House announced plans for a new review of NASA's human spaceflight program led by Norm Augustine, who chaired another space policy review nearly 20 years ago. Michael Huang expresses concern that the choice of Augustine as panel chair may lead to conclusions that could put the overall program in jeopardy.
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1370/1

--------------------------------------------------------------------

During my time at NASA Ames Research Center there were several changes in NASA Administrators and several reorganizations.
For a long time, no talking about going to the Moon with humans, then it became acceptable, and probable.
I feel for those still working at the various NASA Centers and Field Facilities, wondering what is coming next.
http://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/OrganizationIndex.html

Thanks for looking up with me.

Larry Kellogg

Web Site: http://lkellogg.vttoth.com/LarryRussellKellogg/
BlogSpot: http://kelloggserialreports.blogspot.com/
RSS link: http://kelloggserialreports.blogspot.com/atom.xml
Newsletter: https://news.altair.com/mailman/listinfo/lunar-update
==============================================================
--- Will the new report look like the old one? Should you worry about going to the Moon?
- LRK -
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/augustin.html
Principal Recommendations of the Augustine Commission, 1990
[Editorial Headnote: From the Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1990), pp. 47-48. Page numbers of original document in brackets.]


[47] Principal Recommendations

This report offers specific recommendations pertaining to civil space goals and program content as well as suggestions relating to internal NASA management. These are summarized below in four primary groupings. In order to implement fully these recommendations and suggestions, the support of both the Executive Branch and Legislative Branch will be needed, and of NASA itself.


Principal Recommendations Concerning Space Goals

It is recommended that the United States' future civil space program consist of a balanced set of five principal elements:

* a science program, which enjoys highest priority within the civil
space program, and is maintained at or above the current fraction
of the NASA budget (Recommendations 1 and 2);
* a Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) focusing on environmental
measurements (Recommendation 3);
* a Mission from Planet Earth (MFPE), with the long-term goal of
human exploration of Mars, preceded by a modified Space Station
which emphasizes life-sciences, an exploration base on the moon,
and robotic precursors to Mars (Recommendations 4, 5, 6, and 7);
* a significantly expanded technology development activity, closely
coupled to space mission objectives, with particular attention
devoted to engines + a robust space transportation system
(Recommendation 9).


Principal Recommendations Concerning Programs

With regard to program content, it is recommended that:

* the strategic plan for science currently under consideration be
implemented (Recommendation 2);
* a revitalized technology plan be prepared with strong input from
the mission offices, and that it be funded (Recommendation 8);
* Space Shuttle missions be phased over to a new unmanned
(heavy-lift) launch vehicle except for mission where human
involvement is essential or other critical national needs dictate
(Recommendation 9);
* Space Station Freedom be revamped to emphasize life-sciences and
human space operations, and include microgravity research as
appropriate. It should be reconfigured to reduce cost and
complexity; and the current 90-day time limit on redesign should
be extended if a thorough reassessment is not possible in that
period (Recommendation 6);
* a personnel module be provided, as planned, for emergency return
from Space Station Freedom, and that initial provisions be made
for two-way missions in the event of unavailability of the Space
Shuttle (Recommendation 11).


Principal Recommendations Concerning Affordability

It is recommended that the NASA program be structured in scope so as not to exceed a funding profile containing approximately 10 percent real growth per year throughout the remainder of the decade and then remaining at that level, including but not limited to the following actions:

* redesign and reschedule the Space Station Freedom to reduce cost
and complexity (Recommendation 6);
* defer or eliminate the planned purchase of another orbiter
(Recommendation 10);
* place the Mission from Planet Earth on a "go-as-you-pay" basis,
i.e., tailoring the schedule to match the availability of funds
(Recommendation 5).


Principal Recommendations Concerning Management

With regard to management of the civil space program, it is recommended that:

* an Executive Committee of the Space Council be established which
includes the Administrator of NASA (Recommendation 12);
* major reforms be made in the civil service regulations as they
apply to specialty skills; or, if that is not possible, exemptions
be granted to NASA for at least 10 percent of its employees to
operate under a tailored personnel system; or, as a final [48]
alternative, that NASA begin selectively converting at least some
of its centers into university-affiliated Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers (Recommendations 14 and 15);
* NASA management review the mission of each center to consolidate
and refocus centers of excellence in currently relevant fields
with minimum overlap among centers (Recommendation 13).

It is considered by the Committee that the internal organization of any institution should be the province of, and at the discretion of, those bearing ultimate responsibility for the performance of that institution. . . .

* That the current headquarters structure be revamped,
disestablishing the positions of certain existing Associate
Administrators . . .
* an exceptionally well-qualified independent cost analysis group be
attached to headquarters with ultimate responsibility for all
top-level cost estimating including cost estimates provided
outside of NASA;
* a systems concept and analysis group reporting to the
Administrator of NASA be established as a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center;
* multi-center projects be avoided wherever possible, but when this
is not practical, a strong and independent project office
reporting to headquarters be established near the center having
the principle share of the work for that project; and that this
project office have a systems engineering staff and full budget
authority (ideally industrial funding--i.e., funding allocations
related specifically to end-goals).

In summary, we recommend:

* 1) Establishing the science program as the highest priority
element of the civil space program, to be maintained at or above
the current fraction of the budget.
* 2) Obtaining exclusions for a portion of NASA's employees from
existing civil service rules or, failing that, beginning a gradual
conversion of selected centers to Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers affiliated with universities, using as a model
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
* 3) Redesigning the Space Station Freedom to lessen complexity and
reduce cost, taking whatever time may be required to do this
thoroughly and innovatively.
* 4) Pursuing a Mission from Planet Earth as a complement to the
Mission to Planet Earth, with the former having Mars as its very
long-term goal--but relieved of schedule pressures and progressing
according to the availability of funding.
* 5) Reducing our dependence on the Space Shuttle by phasing over to
a new unmanned heavy lift launch vehicle for all but missions
requiring human presence.

The Committee would be pleased to meet again in perhaps six months should the NASA Administrator so desire, in order to assist on the implementation process. In the meantime, NASA may wish to seek the assistance of its regular outside advisory group, the NASA Advisory Council, to provide independent and ongoing advice for implementing these findings.

Each of the recommendations herein is supported unanimously by the members of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
/For further information, please contact histinfo@hq.nasa.gov /

snip
==============================================================
http://www.freemars.org/history/augustine/index.html


Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program

Washington, D.C.

December 17, 1990

TO: The Administrator of NASA

Enclosed, in accordance with the schedule established 120 days ago, is the final report of the Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program. The Committee members look forward to reporting our findings with you to the Vice President.

The Committee's twelve members represent a broad diversity of backgrounds, comprising in the aggregate several hundred years experience in space activities but also including one member with no specific prior experience in space matters. The Committee includes individuals with backgrounds in industry, academia, the military, and a former NASA administrator; its perspectives include that of scientists, former astronauts, managers, engineers, private citizens, and former members of Congress. The Committee is unanimous in its findings.

The members are grateful to the more than 300 individuals who appeared before the Committee or its working groups as well as to the several hundred persons who wrote provocative, thoughtful letters -- often filling many pages. The Committee also had the opportunity to read or be briefed on over a dozen earlier studies of specific aspects of the civil space program.

The Committee's hearings were held in public session and were carried over satellite television for those interested. The Committee chose to perform its own inquiry and hence had no research staff but was ably supported by a small but excellent administrative staff. The cooperation and openness of the NASA employees with whom we met was superb, including those involved with our visits to all the NASA centers and headquarters.

We conclude that the civil space program is neither as troubled as some would suggest nor nearly as strong as will be needed, given the magnitude of the challenges the program must undertake in the future.

(signed)
Norman R. Augustine
Laurel L. Wilkening
Pete Aldridge
Don Fuqua
Joseph P. Allen
Robert T. Herres
D. James Baker
David T. Kearns
Edward P. Boland
Louis J. Lanzerotti
Daniel J. Fink
Tom Paine


Executive Summary

The United States' civil space program was rather hurriedly formulated some three decades ago on the heels of the successful launch of the Soviet Sputnik. A dozen humans have been placed on the Moon and safely returned to Earth, seven of the other eight planets have been viewed at close range, including the soft landing of two robot spacecraft on Mars, and a variety of significant astronomical and other scientific observations have been accomplished. Closer to Earth, a network of communications satellites has been established, weather and ocean conditions are now monitored and reported as they occur, and the Earth's surface is observed from space to study natural resources and detect sources of pollution.


Problems and Perspectives.

In spite of these virtually unparalleled achievements, the civil space program and its principal agent, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, are today the subject of considerable criticism. The source of this criticism ranges from concern over technical capability to the complexity of major space projects; from the ability to estimate and control costs to the growth of bureaucracy; and from a perceived lack of an overall space plan to an alleged institutional resistance to new ideas and change. The failure of the Challenger, the recent hydrogen leaks on several Space Shuttle orbiters, the spherical aberration problem encountered with the Hubble Space Telescope, and various launch processing errors such as a work platform left in an engine compartment and discovered during launch preparations, have all heightened this dissatisfaction.

Some of the concern is, in the view of the Committee, deserved and occasionally even self-inflicted. For example, the practice of separately reporting the cost of space missions according to accounting categories (which for bookkeeping purposes allocates launch services to a distinct account) results in confusion as to what is the actual cost of a mission. Yet, in spite of recognized current problems, care must also be taken not to impose potentially disruptive remedies on today's NASA to correct problems that existed in an earlier NASA. The much publicized spherical aberration problem of the Hubble Space Telescope encountered this past year is in fact a consequence of an assembly error left undiscovered in tests conducted a decade ago -- in 1980. The decision to launch the Challenger in cold weather, when the seals between rocket motor segments would be most suspect, took place five years ago and has spurred NASA to many management changes. Since the Challenger accident, NASA has increased the emphasis on safety, and has borne the burden of delaying launches when reasonable questions arose over the readiness to launch safely. On the other hand, processing incidents during launch preparation continue to occur in NASA operations, and to be the cause of justifiable concern.

Because of the intense interest in -- and scrutiny of -- America's commendably open and visible civil space program, it is sometimes easy to overlook the fact that technical problems such as hydrogen leaks, faulty seals and erroneous assembly procedures are not unique to today's space activities, or even to NASA. Although problems of any sort are most emphatically not to be condoned, when comparing today's space program with the successes of the past, it must also be recalled that America's first attempt to launch an Earth satellite using the Vanguard rocket ended in failure. By the end of 1959, 37 satellite launches had been attempted: less than one-third attained orbit. Ten of the first eleven launches of unmanned probes to the Moon to obtain precursor data in support of the Apollo mission failed. Three astronauts were lost in a fire aboard the Apollo capsule during ground testing. A cryogenic storage tank exploded during the mission of Apollo 13 en route to the Moon, seriously damaging the spacecraft. During the few months surrounding the Challenger accident, a Delta, an Atlas-Centaur, two Titan 34-D's, a French Ariane-2 and a Soviet Proton were all lost. Space missions, whether manned or unmanned, are fundamentally difficult and demanding undertakings that depend upon some of the world's most advanced technology. The Saturn V rocket required the integration of some six million components manufactured by thousands of separate contractors. Voyager 2 arrived at Neptune a mere one second behind its final updated schedule after a 12-year, 4.4 billion mile flight, approaching within 3,000 miles of the planet's surface. The information to be gathered by the Earth Observing System could approach 10 trillion bits of information -- about one Library of Congress -- per day. The matter of human frailty is perhaps of even greater import: in the case of the Apollo program, some 400,000 people at some 20,000 locations were involved in its design, test and operation.

snip
-------------
How shall we pay the bills for all of this? First, as already noted, we assume growth in civil space funding for the next decade. We also recommend a redesign of the Space Station, in part, to reduce cost. We would propose diverting funds from the planned additional Space Shuttle orbiter (but not from support hardware needed to assure the Space Shuttle's continued operational viability) to enable construction of the new unmanned heavy lift launch vehicle. We believe that a new unmanned launch vehicle itself can produce substantial savings -- but not in the near term and in the longer term only if we change our processing philosophy and manpower. We recommend configuring the long term manned exploration program, which focuses on Mars but has critical stepping stones along the way in the form of the Space Station and a lunar base, to a schedule that adapts to the availability of funding. And we propose a number of management enhancements that should produce efficiencies and modest attendant cost savings. The most important *ofthis category of improvement, however, is not fully within NASA's wherewithal to implement -- namely, the provision of predictable and stable funding. This will require the support of other parts of the Administration and the Congress. The essential role of this support cannot be overemphasized *ifthe U.S. is to have a successful civil space program.
snip
-------------

Do you live in Minnesota?
- LRK -
[http://www.freemars.org/]
==============================================================
http://www.spacepolitics.com/2009/05/06/that-long-awaited-constellation-review/
Space Politics.Beltway…

That long-awaited Constellation review
May 6, 2009 at 4:37 am ·

It appears that a review of NASA’s Constellation program that had been anticipated by many for weeks, if not months, will finally be moving forward. The Orlando Sentinel reported yesterday afternoon that the White house will officially order that review later this week, perhaps when the detailed NASA budget request for FY2010 is released on Thursday. The review could start later this month and be done in 60 to 90 days. According to Florida Today, the likely chair of the review panel will be Norm Augustine, former chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin (and neither Lori Garver nor Pete Worden, contrary to previous reports). The White House declined to comment on the upcoming review, telling Florida Today only that “the administration believes it is extremely important to ensure that the nation is on a vigorous and sustainable path to achieving its boldest aspirations in space.”

Such a review would not seem to bode well for the Ares 1 in particular, but at least one supporter remained confident about its prospects despite the impending review. “The Ares 1 and 5 vehicles have been through several studies and reviews and I am confident that any additional study will show that the Ares program is our best option to take our astronauts safely to the space station and beyond,” Congressman Parker Griffith (D-AL) told the Huntsville Times.

[A lot of comments if you care to read. - LRK -]

==============================================================

WHAT THE MIND CAN CONCEIVE, AND BELIEVE, IT WILL ACHIEVE - LRK

==============================================================